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Abstract 
We examine the measurement and prediction of worker productivity using a sample of teachers 
and school principals.  We find that principals’ evaluations are positively associated with 
teachers’ estimated contributions to students’ test scores (value-added), and are better predictors 
of teacher value-added than are teacher credentials.  Principals’ assessments of teachers’ 
cognitive and non-cognitive skills are strongly associated with principals’ overall teacher 
evaluations and to a lesser extent with teacher value-added.  While past teacher value-added 
predicts future value-added, principals’ subjective ratings can provide additional information, 
particularly when prior value-added measures are based on a single year of teacher performance.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
___________________________________ 
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I.  Introduction 
 
Recent research consistently finds that teacher productivity is the most 
important component of a school’s effect on student learning and that there is 
considerable heterogeneity in teacher productivity within and across schools 
(Rockoff (2004), Hanushek, et al. (2005), Rivkin, Hanushek and Kain (2005), 
Kane, Rockoff and Staiger (2008), Aaronson, Barrow and Sander (2007)).  
However, relatively little is known about what makes some teachers more 
productive than others in promoting student achievement.  The first few years of 
teacher experience improve productivity (Rockoff (2004), Hanushek, et al. 
(2005), Jepsen (2005), Rivkin, Hanushek and Kain (2005), Boyd, et al. (2006), 
Clotfelter, Ladd and Vigdor (2006, 2007, 2010), Kane, Rockoff and Staiger 
(2008), Harris and Sass (2011)).  But little else in the way of observed teacher 
characteristics seems to consistently matter.1  Thus, while teachers significantly 
impact student achievement, the variation in teacher productivity is still largely 
unexplained by commonly measured teacher characteristics. 
One possible explanation for the inability of extant research to identify the 
determinants of teacher productivity is that researchers have not been measuring 
the characteristics that truly affect productivity.  Recent work in labor economics 
suggests, for example, that personality traits such as conscientiousness play an 
important role in determining worker productivity (Borghans, ter Weel, and 
Weinberg (2008), Cunha, Heckman, Lochner, and Masterov (2006); Heckman, 
Stixrud, and Urzua (2006)).  But the relative predictive value of cognitive and 
                                                 
1 Harris and Sass (2011) find that the gains to experience may extend well beyond the first few 
years. Clotfelter, Ladd and Vigdor (2007, 2010), using North Carolina data, find some teacher 
credentials are correlated with teacher effectiveness, particularly at the secondary level.  
Goldhaber (2007) also uses the North Carolina data and finds similar results, though he questions 
the signal value of credentials that are weakly correlated with productivity.   
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non-cognitive factors is hard to assess due to the difficulty in obtaining measures 
of both cognitive and non-cognitive skills and labor productivity. 
Unraveling the factors associated with teacher productivity could yield 
valuable insights into the most appropriate policies for selecting and training 
teachers.  If teacher productivity is affected primarily by personality 
characteristics that are measurable ex-ante, they could be used to screen 
applicants and identify the most desired candidates in the hiring process.   If, 
however, the most important teacher characteristics are malleable, such as subject 
content knowledge, determining which teacher characteristics have the greatest 
impact on student learning could inform the design of pre-service and in-service 
teacher training programs 
Intertwined with the relationship between teacher characteristics and 
teacher productivity is the issue of how best to evaluate teacher performance.  If 
teacher productivity is not strongly correlated with teacher credentials like 
educational attainment, but is associated with skills that can be discerned through 
observing behavior, direct monitoring and evaluation of teacher performance may 
be advantageous.  Consistent with this idea, school principals are being granted 
greater authority in hiring, evaluation and retention of teachers both through the 
creation of independent charter schools nationwide and through decentralization 
reforms in public school districts such as New York City.  Spurred on by the 
federal Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) and Race to the Top (RTTT) initiatives, 
classroom observations by principals or external evaluators are increasingly being 
used to make high-stakes decisions about employment and compensation.2  The 
downside of subjective evaluations by principals is they may be affected by 
                                                 
2 For in-depth discussions of performance-based compensation in schools see Figlio and Kenny 
(2007) and Podgursky and Springer (2007). 
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personal bias toward factors unrelated to productivity and some principals may 
simply be poor judges of teacher productivity. 
Another possibility is that neither teacher credentials nor observable traits 
are correlated with a teacher’s productivity. In this case ex-post evaluation of 
teachers based on their contributions to student achievement, or “value-added,” 
may be optimal (Gordon, Kane, and Staiger (2006)).  The TIF and RTTT reforms 
also generally involve teacher value-added as part of the overall evaluation.  
However, there are concerns about the precision of value-added measures, their 
narrow focus on student test scores, and the fact that they can only be calculated 
for a small proportion of teachers (Baker et al. (2010); Harris (2011)).  
In this paper we consider the two interrelated issues of the skills associated 
with teacher productivity and how best to evaluate teacher performance.  
Specifically, we address the following four questions: 
1) What characteristics of teachers are associated with teacher productivity? 
2) What information do principals use in assessing teacher performance? 
3) How closely are principal evaluations associated with teacher 
productivity? 
4) How well do principal evaluations and prior measures of teacher 
productivity predict   future teacher productivity?  
We build on extant research in four ways.  First, we go beyond general 
ratings of teacher ability and estimate the relationship between a variety of 
specific teacher personality traits and teacher productivity.  Second, we test how 
well prior value-added scores and prior principal evaluations of teachers predict 
future teacher value-added.  The ability to predict future performance is critical, 
especially when probationary employment periods are followed by decisions that 
provide long-term job security to employees (e.g., teacher tenure) that can affect 
organizational performance for years or decades.  Third, unlike other existing 
studies, we consider how the relationships between teacher characteristics, 
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principal evaluations and teacher value-added vary between elementary and 
middle/high schools, each of which has distinctive organizational structures.  
Finally, while most of our results are from value-added measures based on a low-
stakes test, we also consider results from high-stakes achievement tests, though 
the usefulness of these is limited by much smaller samples in our data set.  
In the next section we describe the small existing literature on subjective 
evaluations of teachers and their relationship with value-added.  This is followed 
by a discussion of the data used for our analysis, including how the interviews 
with principals were conducted and our method for estimating teacher value-
added.  In the concluding section we discuss our empirical results and possible 
policy implications.  
 
II.  Literature Review 
 
The labor economics literature increasingly integrates theories and 
research from psychology.  For example, Cuhna, et al. (2006) model the life cycle 
of skill attainment, giving a prominent position to personality traits.  Borghans, ter 
Weel, and Weinberg (2008) theorize that different types of jobs require different 
combinations of personality traits, especially “directness” and “caring,” and find 
evidence that some of these traits are correlated with productivity.  This is perhaps 
not surprising, especially for jobs (such as teaching) that require substantial 
interpersonal interaction and communication, but it does suggest that economists 
may need to consider more than intelligence when evaluating the role of innate 
ability in labor market outcomes (Borghans, et al. (2008)).  
Personality traits are difficult to measure objectively (Borghans, et al. 
(2008)) and perhaps more easily captured through direct observation.  For this 
reason, the importance of personality traits in determining productivity may also 
affect the optimal mix of subjective supervisor ratings and more objective 
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measures of output in evaluating and compensating workers.  There is a long 
history of research studying the relationships between subjective and objective 
measures of worker productivity, as well as the implications of this relationship 
for optimal employment contracts.  As noted by Jacob and Lefgren (2008), this 
research suggests that there is a relatively weak relationship between subjective 
and objective measures (Bommer, et al. (1995), Heneman (1986)).  One reason 
might be that supervisors are heavily influenced by personality traits, more so 
than is warranted by the role personality actually plays in (objective) productivity.  
This interpretation is reinforced by evidence that evaluators’ subjective 
assessments are biased, in the sense that certain types of workers (e.g., females 
and older workers) receive lower subjective evaluations for reasons that appear 
unrelated to their actual productivity (e.g., Varma and Stroh (2001)).  
There is a limited literature that specifically addresses the relationship 
between subjective and objective assessments of school teachers.  Subjective 
evaluations by school principals are especially interesting because principals are 
typically required to observe teachers and they collect a lot of information 
informally, and inexpensively, in the natural course of being in the school, 
interacting with teachers, talking with parents and so on.  Three older studies have 
examined the relationship between student test scores and principals’ subjective 
assessments using longitudinal student achievement data to measure student 
learning growth (Murnane (1975), Armor, et al. (1976), and Medley and Coker 
(1987)).  However, as noted by Jacob and Lefgren (2008), these studies do not 
account for measurement error in the objective test-based measure and therefore 
under-state the relationship between subjective and objective measures. 
In their work, Jacob and Lefgren address both the selection bias and 
measurement error problems within the context of a value-added model for 
measuring teacher productivity that is linked to principals’ subjective 
assessments.  They obtain student achievement data and combine it with data on 
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principals’ ratings of 201 teachers in a mid-sized school district in a Western 
state.3  Jacob and Lefgren find that previous teacher value-added is a better 
predictor of current student achievement than are current principal ratings.  In 
particular, teacher value-added calculated from test scores in 1998-2002 was a 
significantly better predictor of 2003 test scores (conditional on student and peer 
characteristics) than were 2003 principal ratings made just prior to the 2003 
student exam.  The current principal ratings were also significantly correlated 
with current test scores, conditional on prior value-added.  While this latter 
finding suggests contemporaneous principal ratings add information, the reason is 
not clear.  The principal ratings might provide more precise indicators of previous 
teacher productivity (especially when there is little prior test score information, as 
is often the case), since past value-added is subject to transient shocks to student 
test scores.  Alternatively, the principal ratings may simply reflect new current-
school-year (2002/03) performance information not included in past value-added 
(based on test scores through 2001/02).  In order to sort out these effects, in our 
analysis we compare the ability of current value-added and current principal 
ratings to predict future teacher value-added. 
The only prior study to consider principals’ assessments of specific 
teacher characteristics, as opposed to the overall rating, is an unpublished working 
paper by Jacob and Lefgren (2005).  While they find a positive and significant 
relationship between the teacher value-added and teachers’ relationship with the 
school administration, this is the only teacher characteristic they consider.   
Rockoff, et al. (forthcoming) study an experiment in which elementary 
and middle school principals in New York City were randomly assigned to 
receive teacher value-added information.  They found that principals change their 
evaluations of teachers when they receive new information about the impact of 
                                                 
3 As in the present study, the district studied by Jacob and Lefgren chose to remain anonymous. 
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teachers on student test scores.  The extent of updating is positively related to the 
precision of value-added information they receive and negatively related to the 
quality of their own prior information on teachers.  The acquisition of new 
information also appears to have significant effects on personnel decisions and 
student outcomes.  Rockoff, et al. find that teachers with low value-added scores 
were more likely to exit their schools after the principal received value-added 
information which in turn led to a small increase in student test scores.  While not 
the focus of their analysis, Rockoff, et al. also estimate pre-experiment 
correlations between various value-added measures and principals’ evaluations of 
their teachers.  They find positive correlations, similar in magnitude to those 
obtained by Jacob and Lefgren.  The correlations tend to increase with the 
precision of the value-added estimates and with the number of years the principal 
has known a teacher.   
Most recently, Kane, et al. (2012) report interim results from the Measures 
of Effective Teaching (MET) project, sponsored by the Gates Foundation.  The 
project measures teacher productivity in different ways, including through student 
evaluations, observations of classroom practice by trained evaluators, and, as in 
our study, student performance on two different achievement tests.4  The MET 
project does not include principal evaluations, however.  Kane, et al. compare the 
ability of teacher observations, student surveys and value-added in one classroom 
                                                 
4 A number of other studies have examined the relationship between the achievement levels of 
teachers’ students and subjective teacher ratings that are based on formal standards and extensive 
classroom observation (Gallagher (2004), Kimball et al. (2004), Milanowski (2004)).  For 
example, in Milanowski (2004), the subjective evaluations are based on an extensive standards-
framework that required principals and assistant principals to observe each teacher six times in 
total and, in each case, to rate the teacher on 22 separate dimensions.  All of these studies find a 
positive and significant relationship, despite differences in the way they measure teacher value-
added and in the degree to which the observations are used for high-stakes personnel decisions.  
While these studies have the advantage of more structured subjective evaluations, the reliance on 
achievement levels with no controls for lagged achievement or prior educational inputs makes it 
difficult to estimate teacher value-added. 
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to predict teacher value added in another course section by the same teacher in the 
same time period.5  They find that the best predictor is value added, with only a 
modest improvement from adding in classroom observations and student 
feedback.     
 
III.  Data and Methods 
 
We begin by describing the general characteristics of the school district 
and sample of principals, teachers and students.  We then discuss in more detail 
the two main components of the data: (a) administrative data that are used to 
estimate teacher value-added; and (b) principal interview data that provide 
information about principals’ overall assessments of teachers as well as ratings of 
specific teacher characteristics.   
A. General Sample Description 
The analysis is based on interviews with 30 principals from an anonymous 
mid-sized Florida school district.  The district includes a heterogeneous 
population of students.  For example, among the sampled schools, the school-
average proportion of students eligible for free/reduced price lunches varies from 
less than 10 percent to more than 90 percent.  Similarly, there is considerable 
heterogeneity among schools in the racial/ethnic distribution of their students.  
We interviewed principals from 17 elementary (or K-8) schools, six middle 
schools, four high schools, and three special population schools, representing 
more than half of the principals in the district.  The racial distribution of 
interviewed principals is comparable to the national average of all principals 
(sample district: 78 percent White; national: 82 percent White) as is the 
                                                 
5 They also evaluate the relative performance of the measures to “predict” past performance by the 
same teacher. 
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percentage with at least a master’s degree (sample district: 100 percent; national: 
90.7 percent).6  However, the percentage female is somewhat larger (sample 
district: 63 percent; national: 44 percent). 
The advantage of studying a school district in Florida is that the state has a 
long tradition of strong test-based accountability (Harris, Herrington and Albee, 
2007) that has now come to pass in other states as a result of the federal No Child 
Left Behind policy.  The state has long graded schools on an A-F scale.  The 
number of schools receiving the highest grade has risen over time; in our sample 
20 schools received the highest grade (A) during the 2005-06 school year; the 
lowest performing school in the district received a grade of D.  It is reasonable to 
expect that accountability policies, such as the school grades mentioned above, 
influence the objectives that principals see for their schools and therefore their 
subjective evaluations of teachers.  For example, we might expect a closer 
relationship between value-added and subjective assessments in high 
accountability contexts where principals are not only more aware of test scores in 
general, but where principals are increasingly likely to know the test scores, and 
perhaps test score gains, made by students of individual teachers.  We discuss the 
potential influence of this phenomenon later in the analysis, but emphasize here 
that, by studying a Florida school district, the results of our analysis are more 
applicable to the current policy environment where high-stakes achievement-
focused accountability is federal policy.   
                                                 
6 The national data on principals comes from the 2003-2004 Schools and Staffing Survey (SASS) 
as reported in the Digest of Education Statistics (National Center for Education Statistics, 2006).  
Part of the reason that this sample of principals has higher levels of educational attainment is that 
Florida law makes it difficult to become a principal without a master’s degree. 
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B. Student Achievement Data and Modeling 
Throughout Florida there is annual testing in grades 3-10 for both math 
and reading.  Until recently, two tests were administered, a high-stakes, criterion-
referenced exam based on the state curriculum standards known as the FCAT-
Sunshine State Standards (SSS) exam, and a low-stakes, norm-referenced test 
(NRT) which is the Stanford Achievement Test.  We mainly employ the low-
stakes NRT in the present analysis for two reasons.  First, it is a vertically scaled 
test, meaning that unit changes in the achievement score should have the same 
meaning at all points along the scale.  Second, and most importantly, the district 
under study also administers the NRT in grades 1 and 2, allowing us to compute 
achievement gains for students in grades 2-10.  Achievement data on the NRT are 
available for each of the school years 1999/00 through 2007/08.7  The SSS exam 
was instituted a year later and thus scores on the high-stakes test are only 
available for the 2000/01-2007/08 school years. Using the low-stakes test we are 
able to estimate the determinants of achievement gains for five years prior to the 
principal interviews, 2000/01-2005/06, and for two years after the interviews, 
2006/07-2007/08.  In order to account for any differences in test content and 
scaling across grades across time, we normalize test scores by grade and year.  
Characteristics of the sample used in the value-added analysis are described in 
Table 1.   
In order to compute value-added scores for teachers we estimate a model 
of student achievement, At, of the following form: 
itgtgmkijmtititit AA    PβXβ 211  (1) 
                                                 
7 Prior to 2004/05 version 9 of the Stanford Achievement Test (SAT-9) was administered.  
Beginning in 2004/05 the SAT-10 was given.  All SAT-10 scores have been converted to SAT-9 
equivalent scores based on the conversion tables in Harcourt (2002). 
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The effects of prior educational inputs are captured by the lagged test score, Ait-1, 
and are assumed to diminish geometrically over time at a rate (1-).  The vector 
Xit includes time-varying student characteristics such as student mobility, 
free/reduced-price lunch eligibility and limited English proficiency status as well 
as time-constant student attributes like race/ethnicity and gender.  The vector of 
peer characteristics, P-ijmt (where the subscript –i students other than individual i 
in the classroom), includes both exogenous peer characteristics and the number of 
peers or class size.  In addition, a teacher fixed effect (k), a school fixed effect 
(m) and a sets of grade-repeater-by-grade (g) and grade-by-year indicators (gt) 
are also included.8  The teacher fixed effect captures both the time-invariant 
characteristics of teachers as well as the average value of time-varying 
characteristics like experience and possession of an advanced degree.  Since 
school fixed effects are included, the estimated teacher effects represent the 
“value-added” of an individual teacher relative to the average teacher at the 
school.  The final term, it, is a mean zero random error. 
The achievement model depicted in equation (1) is but one of many 
commonly estimated value-added models.  We utilize it as our primary model 
since recent experimental and simulation-based evidence suggests it is likely to 
produce relatively unbiased estimates of teacher effects under a range of 
conditions ((Kane and Staiger (2008), Guarino, Reckase and Wooldridge (2011)).  
However, we show in Appendix Table A2 that the relationship between value-
added estimates of teacher productivity and principal evaluations of teacher 
quality are similar when other value-added models, ones that assume complete 
                                                 
8 The full set of student and peer explanatory variables is delineated in appendix table A1. 
 12
persistence in prior inputs or control for student heterogeneity with student fixed 
effects, are employed.9    
Recently, Rothstein (2010) has argued that value-added models may 
produce biased estimates of teacher productivity due to the non-random 
assignment of students to teachers within schools.  For example, if students who 
experience an unusually high achievement gain in one year are assigned to 
particular teachers the following year and there is mean reversion in student test 
scores, the estimated value-added for the teachers with high prior-year gains will 
be biased downward.  Rothstein proposes falsification tests based on the idea that 
future teachers cannot have causal effects on current achievement gains.  We 
conduct falsification tests of this sort, using the methodology employed by Koedel 
and Betts (2011).  For each level of schooling, elementary, middle and high, we 
fail to reject the null of strict exogeneity, indicating that the data from the district 
we analyze in this study are not subject to the sort of dynamic sorting bias 
concerns raised by Rothstein.10 
As noted by Jacob and Lefgren, another concern is measurement error in 
the estimated teacher effects.  Given the variability in student test scores, value-
added estimates will yield “noisy” measures of teacher productivity, particularly 
for teachers with relatively few students (McCaffrey, et al (2009)).  We employ 
three strategies to alleviate the measurement error problem.  First, we limit our 
sample to teachers who taught at least five students with achievement gain data.  
Second, we employ the measurement-error correction procedure adopted by Jacob 
and Lefgren when evaluating the strength of correlations between value-added 
                                                 
9 For a thorough discussion of various value-added models and the assumptions that underlie 
them, see Todd and Wolpin (2003) and Harris, Sass and Semykina (2011). 
10 The failure to reject strict exogeneity may indicate that prior test-score gains are not used to 
assign students to teachers in the studied district or to the fact that we are including many cohorts 
of students per teacher in our analysis (Koedel and Betts (2011)). 
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and subjective evaluations by principals.11  Third, in regression analyses where 
value-added is the dependent variable we use a feasible generalized least squares 
(FGLS) estimation procedure which accounts for estimation error in the 
dependent variable.12  As noted by Mihaly et al. (2010), standard fixed-effects 
software routines compute fixed effects relative to some arbitrary hold-out unit 
(e.g. an omitted  teacher), which can produce wildly incorrect standard errors and 
thus inappropriate corrections for measurement error in the estimated teacher 
effects.  Therefore, to estimate the teacher effects and their standard errors we 
employ the Stata routine felsdvregdm, developed by Mihaly et al. (2010), which 
imposes a sum-to-zero constraint on the teacher estimated teacher effects within a 
school and produces the appropriate standard errors for making measurement 
error adjustments.13 
C. Principal Interview Data 
Interviews were conducted in the summer of 2006.  Each principal was 
asked to rate up to ten teachers in grades and subjects that are subject to annual 
student achievement testing.  Per the requirements of the district, the interviews 
were “single-blind” so that the principal knew the names of the teachers but the 
interviewer knew only a randomly assigned number associated with the names.  
From the administrative data described above, we identified teachers in 
tested grades and subjects in the 30 schools who had taught at least one course 
with 10 or more tested students and who were still in the school in the 2004/05 
school year (the last year for which complete administrative data were available 
                                                 
11 See Jacob and Lefgren (2008), p.113.   
12 Specifically, we employ the method developed by Lewis and Linzer (2005) and embodied in the 
Stata routine edvreg. 
13 All standard errors on the estimated teacher effects are corrected for clustering at the classroom 
level using the method suggested by Moulton (1990).  
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prior to arranging the principal interviews).  In some cases, there were fewer than 
ten teachers who met these requirements.  Even in schools that had ten teachers 
on the list, there were cases where some teachers were not actually working in the 
respective schools at the time of the interview.  If the principal was familiar with a 
departed teacher and felt comfortable making an assessment, then these teachers 
and subjective assessments were included in the analysis.  If the principal was not 
sufficiently familiar with the departed teacher, then the teacher was dropped.  
Many schools had more than ten teachers.  In these cases, we attempted to create 
an even mix of five teachers of reading and math.  If there were more than five 
teachers in a specific subject, we chose a random sample of five to be included in 
the list.        
In the interviews, principals were first asked to mark on a sheet of paper 
the principal’s overall assessment of each teacher, using a 1-9 scale.14  The 
interviewer then handed the principal another sheet of paper so that he/she could 
rate each teacher on each of 12 characteristics: caring, communication skills, 
enthusiasm, intelligence, knowledge of subject, strong teaching skills, motivation, 
works well with grade team/department, works well with me (the principal), 
contributes to school activities beyond the classroom, and contributes to overall 
school community.  The first seven characteristics in this list were found by 
Harris, Rutledge, Ingle, and Thompson (2010) to be among the most important 
characteristics that principals look for when hiring teachers.15  Having an 
                                                 
14 The specific question was: “First, I would like you to rate each of the ten teachers relative to the 
other teachers on the list.  Please rate each teacher on a scale from 1-9 with 1 being not effective to 
9 being exceptional.  Place an X in the box to indicate your choice. Also please circle the number 
of any teachers whose students are primarily special populations.”  
15 As described in Harris, Rutledge, Ingle and Thompson (2010), the data in this study came from 
the second in a series of interviews carried out by the researchers.  During the summer of 2005, 
interviews were conducted regarding the hiring process and principals preferred characteristics of 
teachers.  The first set of interviews was important because it helped validate the types of teacher 
characteristics we consider.  Principals were asked an open-ended question in the first interview 
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occupation-specific list of characteristics is important because recent economic 
theory and evidence suggest that different traits matter more in different 
occupations and specifically that “caring” is more important in teaching than in 
any other occupation (Borghans, ter Weel, and Weinberg (2008)). 
The interview questions were designed so that principals would evaluate 
teachers relative to others in the school.16  One reason for doing so is that even an 
“absolute” evaluation would be necessarily based on each principal’s own 
experiences.  This implies that ratings on individual characteristics across 
principals may not be based on a common reference point or a common scale.  
Therefore, like Jacob and Lefgren, we normalize the ratings of each teacher 
characteristic to have a mean of zero and standard deviation of one over all 
teachers rated by a given principal.  Given our teacher fixed-effects estimates are 
within-school measures, normalizing the ratings allow us to compare within-
school ratings to within-school teacher value-added.    
The final activity of the interview involved asking the principals to rate 
each teacher according to the following additional “outcome” measures: raises 
FCAT math achievement, raises FCAT reading achievement, and raises FCAT 
writing achievement.  These last measures help us test whether the differences 
between the value-added measures and the principals’ overall assessments are due 
to philosophical differences regarding the importance of student achievement as 
                                                                                                                                     
about the teacher characteristics they prefer.  Two-thirds of these responses could be placed in one 
of 12 categories identified from previous studies on teacher quality.  The list here takes those 
ranked highest by principals in the first interview and then adds some of those included by Jacob 
and Lefgren.     
16 In contrast, in the Rockoff, et al. (forthcoming) study, principals were asked to compare each 
teacher to all “teachers [they] have known who taught the same grade/subject,” not just teachers at 
their own school.  
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an educational outcome or to difficulty in identifying teachers who increase 
student test scores. 
To lessen potential multicollinearity problems and reduce the number of 
teacher characteristics to analyze, we conduct a factor analysis of the 11 
individual teacher characteristics rated by principals.  As indicated in Table 2, the 
individual characteristics can be summarized into four factors:  interpersonal 
skills, motivation/enthusiasm, ability to work with others, and 
knowledge/teaching skills/intelligence. 
Finally, as part of the interview, we discovered that principals have access 
to a district-purchased software program, SnapshotTM, that allows them to create 
various cross-tabulations of student achievement data on the high-stakes SSS 
exam, including simple student learning gains and mean learning gains by 
teacher.  While we have no data about the actual usage of this software, 
subsequent informal conversations with two principals suggests that at least some 
principals use the program to look at the achievement gains made by students of 
each teacher.  While this may have provided principals with some information 
about unconditional student average achievement gains, that is of course not the 
same thing as the teacher value-added scores, which are conditional on student 
and peer characteristics.  Nevertheless, we calculate and analyze alternative 
teacher performance measures that approximate those that principals may have 
seen with the software package. 
 
IV. Results 
 
In order to compute value-added scores for teachers we estimate equation 
(1) using data on current and lagged test scores for grades 2-10 over the period 
2000/01 through 2005/06 with the low-stakes NRT test and report these results 
throughout the main text.  
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A.  The Association between Teacher Traits and Teacher Productivity   
Simple pairwise correlations among the estimated teacher fixed effects 
and the four teacher characteristic factors are presented in Table 3.  For 
correlations with value-added we include correlations adjusted for estimation 
error in the teacher effects.  There are positive relationships between teacher 
value-added in math and each of the teacher characteristic factors; correlations 
adjusted for estimation error are each in the range of 0.19 to 0.34.    For reading, 
the adjusted correlations between teacher traits and teacher productivity in 
promoting student achievement are in the range of 0.20 to 0.45. 
Teacher personality traits are all positively and strongly correlated with 
one another in both subjects; correlations are in the range of 0.61 to 0.76.  It is not 
obvious that this should be the case, e.g., that teachers who are more 
knowledgeable would also tend to have better interpersonal skills.  There might 
be a “halo effect” whereby teachers who are rated highly by the principal overall 
are automatically given high marks on all of the individual characteristics, though 
this is very difficult to test without having some other independent measure of 
teacher characteristics.  Finally, note that among the four teacher characteristic 
factors, knowledge/teaching skills/intelligence is most closely associated with 
teacher value-added in math while value-added estimates of teacher performance 
in reading are most closely associated with motivation/enthusiasm of the 
teacher.17   
                                                 
17 Our comparisons in Table 3 are between value-added based on all prior available information 
and a single-year principal evaluation.  If teacher productivity varies over time and principals 
weight current performance more than the correlations could differ if we instead had used only 
recent achievement data to form the value-added measures of teacher productivity.  We explore 
this issue in appendix table A3, where we present correlations of value added with principal 
ratings and teacher traits using varying time periods to calculate value added.  We find that the 
correlations with contemporaneous (2005/06) value added are quite similar to those with value 
added constructed from all prior information (1999/00-2005/06).  
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A multivariate analysis of the relationship between teacher traits and 
teacher value-added is presented in Table 4.  Results in column [1] indicate that 
knowledge/teaching skills/intelligence is positively and significantly associated 
with teacher value-added in math only.  None of the other coefficients in column 
[1] are significant.  Column [2] shows that the magnitude of the effect on math 
achievement of knowledge/teaching/intelligence skills is nearly identical in 
elementary and middle/high school, though the precision is much lower in 
middle/high school.  The overall explanatory power of the four factors is quite 
low, however, with R-squared values of 0.14.18  For reading, the only factor 
which is statistically significant is teacher motivation/enthusiasm.  Once again, 
the effect is equal in magnitude across grades, but only statistically significant for 
elementary school teachers.  The relative importance of subject matter knowledge 
in math teacher performance is consistent with recent findings that “Teach for 
America” teachers, who possess exceptionally strong academic credentials, tend 
to outperform traditionally prepared teachers in teaching math, but are on par with 
traditionally prepared teachers in reading instruction.19 
B.  The Information Principals Use in Forming Their Teacher Assessments  
To determine what factors are important to a principal in forming their 
evaluation of a teacher we compute pairwise correlations among the four teacher 
characteristic factors and two measures of a principal’s rating of teachers: the 
overall rating and the rating of the teacher’s ability to raise test scores.  The 
results, presented in Table 5, indicate that the overall rating is highly correlated 
                                                 
18 Some of the insignificant effects may be due to multicollinearity.  As demonstrated in Table 3, 
the four factors are all positively correlated.  When each factor is regressed on estimated teacher 
effects separately, all are significant except “works well with others” in predicting the value-added 
of reading teachers.  
19 See Boyd, et al. (2006), Kane, Rockoff and Staiger (2008) and Xu, Hannaway and Taylor 
(2011). 
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with the “ability to raise test scores” rating (0.73 in math and 0.74 in reading).  As 
with value added, principal ratings are most highly correlated with 
knowledge/teaching skills/intelligence in math and motivation/enthusiasm in 
reading. 
A multivariate analysis of the relationship between the teacher 
characteristic factors and overall principal ratings is presented in Table 6.  For 
math, knowledge/teaching skills/intelligence contributes the most to the 
principals’ overall rating at all grade levels.  At the elementary level, “works well 
with others” and interpersonal skill are also statistically significant, but the point 
estimates are much smaller.  In reading, motivation/enthusiasm and interpersonal 
skill are each statistically significant across all grade levels while 
knowledge/teaching skills/intelligence is only significantly different from zero at 
the elementary level.  Across both subject the four factors explain more than 80 
percent of the variation in overall ratings, suggesting that the underlying 12 
characteristics are important determinants of principals’ overall ratings.20 
We noted above how principal ratings may be influenced by knowledge of 
student test scores, especially since at least some interviewed principals had 
access to software that provides student average test score gains broken down by 
teacher.  The achievement gain data accessible to principals are based on the 
developmental scale score (DSS) derived from the high-stakes SSS exam.  In 
Table 7 we show that principals’ overall rankings of teachers are positively 
correlated with once-lagged average SSS gains for math teachers, but overall 
rankings of reading teachers are not significantly correlated with average student 
achievement gains.  The “ability to raise test scores” ratings are uncorrelated with 
                                                 
20 This result could also be driven by the halo effect described earlier.  However, principals were 
also asked to describe their teachers in their own words.  In a working paper (Harris, Ingle, and 
Rutledge, 2012), we have found that the vast majority of their responses could be placed in one of 
the 12 categories, suggesting that these categories are indeed the main ones principals think about. 
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average student test-score gains in both math and reading, suggesting that 
principals did not use the computer software to evaluate teacher performance.  
Thus while recent evidence produced by Rockoff et al in New York suggests that 
principals incorporate value-added information in their assessment of teachers, in 
our Florida example we do not find strong evidence that principals are influenced 
by having access to simple (e.g., not conditioned on student characteristics) 
average student test-score gains. 
C.  The Association between Principal Evaluations and Teacher Value-Added  
 Table 8 presents FGLS estimates of the determinants of the teacher fixed 
effects, which account for estimation error in the teacher effects.  The first column 
reports estimates where only standard teacher credentials (experience, possession 
of an advanced degree) are included as explanatory variables.  None of the 
credential variables is a statistically significant determinant of teacher value-
added scores.21  .  
In contrast, when a principal’s overall rating of a teacher or their 
assessment of a teacher’s ability to raise test scores is added to the model, its 
coefficient is positive and highly significant for both reading and math.  (The 
coefficients on teacher credentials are largely unchanged.)  This suggests that 
principals have knowledge about teacher productivity that is not captured by the 
standard measures of experience and educational attainment that typically form 
the basis for teacher pay scales.  The magnitudes of the coefficients are 
                                                 
21 In another study using statewide data from Florida (Harris and Sass (2011)), the effects of 
teacher experience are highly significant when teacher fixed effects are excluded, but within-
teacher changes in experience are less often statistically significant.  The finding that experience is 
insignificant in models with teacher fixed effects could mean that some apparent cross-teacher 
experience effects are due to attrition of less effective teachers early in their careers or that there is 
simply insufficient within-teacher variation in experience over a short panel The lack of 
significance may also be due to the relatively small sample size and the fact that the district being 
studied has a relatively high average level of teacher experience. 
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substantial. For example, the coefficient on principals’ overall ratings for math 
teachers in Table 8 is 0.059, which implies that a teacher who is rated one point 
higher on the 1-9 scale raises student math test scores six hundreths of a standard 
deviation.  Put differently, given the standard deviation in principal ratings is 
1.68, a one-standard deviation in increase in the principal’s overall rating of a 
math teacher corresponds to a 0.10 standard deviation increase in the teacher’s 
student’s test scores or moving students from the 50th to the 54th percentile.    
In Table 9 we present estimates where the correlation between principal 
ratings and estimated teacher value-added is allowed to vary between elementary 
school and middle/high school.  At both the elementary and middle/high school 
levels, the overall principal rating is positively and statistically significantly 
associated with the teacher fixed effect in both reading and in math.  The “ability 
to raise test scores” rating is also statistically significant in all but middle/high 
school reading.22  However, the association between teacher value-added and a 
one-point increase in the principal’s rating scale on teacher value-added in 
reading is generally smaller than for math.  This is consistent with the general 
finding in the literature that the effects of teacher characteristics on student 
achievement tend to be less pronounced in reading.  It is often suggested that 
reading scores are more likely to be influenced by factors outside of school; 
students may read books in their free time, but they seldom work math problems 
for enjoyment. Alternatively, principals may not be as good at evaluating the 
performance of teachers in reading instruction. 
                                                 
22 Three of the statistically significant coefficients in Table 10 (overall ratings in middle/high math 
and reading; ability to raise test scores in middle/high math) are statistically insignificant in the 
model that includes student fixed effects.  Put differently, there are no statistically significant 
partial correlations between any of the middle high school principal ratings and teacher value-
added.  See appendix tables for details.   
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One would expect that the longer a principal has known their teachers the 
more accurate would be the principal’s evaluation of their performance.  Further, 
principals may gain general human capital in personnel evaluation as their 
experience as a supervisor increases.  To test these ideas we regress the 
correlation between teacher fixed effects and principal evaluations on the duration 
of a principal’s tenure as principal at their current school (representing teacher-
specific knowledge) and the principal’s years of experience in educational 
administration (a proxy for general personnel evaluation skills).  Results are 
presented in Table 10.  We find mixed evidence regarding the above hypotheses.  
School-specific experience and general administrative experience are not 
significantly correlated with the relationship between value-added and principal 
ratings of reading teachers. With small sample sizes of 22-26 principals, the 
limited statistical significance is unsurprising.    
The coefficient on principals’ tenure in the school is positive and 
significant in the regression predicting the correlation between value-added and a 
principal’s overall evaluation of math teachers, but the opposite holds when we 
turn to principal school-specific tenure.  The negative coefficient on “ability to 
raise test scores” is surprising, but there are at least two possible explanations.  
Principals, as they get to know teachers, may begin to assess them more based on 
their relationships (i.e., how well the principal gets along teachers) rather than 
objective performance, though this hypothesis is difficult to test with these data.  
Also, we estimated the value-added models with a second specification (the same 
as equation (1) but with the addition of student fixed effects) and the negative 
coefficient is essentially zero in that case (see  appendix tables).   
In addition to general correlations, we also consider the ability of 
principals to identify productive teachers at various parts of the teacher value-
added distribution.  In Table 11 we present cross-tabulations of the rankings of 
teacher value-added and principals’ ratings of teachers on both the “overall” and 
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“ability to raise test scores” metrics.23  It appears that for both math and reading, 
principals are better at identifying low value-added teachers, rather than top-
performing teachers.  Of those teachers who rank in the bottom 30 percent based 
on value-added in math, 65 percent are also ranked in the bottom 30 percent by 
their principal.  In contrast, only 16 percent of teachers in the top 30 percent in 
math value-added are also ranked in the 30 percent by their principal.  Similar 
differences appear for reading teachers.24   
Our findings differ from those of Jacob and Lefgren (2008).  They find 
that principals are relatively good at distinguishing both high and low value-added 
teachers, with a somewhat better alignment of principal ratings with teacher 
value-added for the top rated teachers.  At least two possible explanations for the 
divergent results come to mind.  The underlying distribution of teacher quality 
may be more uniform in our sample, making it more difficult to distinguish the 
best teachers from middling teachers.  Alternatively, some groups of principals 
may simply be better than others in identifying high-value-added teachers.  In 
either case, the principals in both Jacob and Lefgren’s analysis and in the present 
study seem to be able to identify their lowest-performing teachers.   
D.  The Relative Ability of Prior Performance and Teacher Rankings to Predict 
Future Teacher Performance 
To this point, as in all prior studies, we have been comparing principal 
evaluations of teachers with value-added measures constructed from all available 
prior student test scores (i.e. principal ratings from summer 2006 with value-
                                                 
23 In addition to the three-category rankings presented in Table 5, we also computed cross-
tabulations based on quintile rankings.  The patterns of results were very similar.  Given there are 
at most 10 teachers per school, the three-category ranking system seems more appropriate. 
24 The fact that in the high (low) category, teachers can only move down (up) whereas those in the 
middle can move in two directions could explain why the proportion of teachers with similar 
rankings is higher in the middle category than in the top category, but it does not explain why the 
proportion with similar rankings in the bottom category is higher. 
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added based on achievement data up through the 2005/06 school year). Such 
contemporaneous estimates of teacher productivity are relevant to decisions about 
the role of principal evaluations in measuring and rewarding past performance.  
However, contemporaneous measures of teacher performance are not particularly 
relevant for retention and tenure decisions, where the decision should (optimally) 
be based on predictions about future performance. 
We measure future teacher productivity by re-estimating equation (1), 
using data on student achievement gains from the 2006/07 and 2007/08 school 
years (including test scores from 2005/06 as the initial lagged value) to derive 
estimates of future teacher value-added.  As demonstrated by (McCaffrey, et al. 
(2009)), basing teacher value-added on two years of performance leads to much 
more precise estimates than relying on a single estimated test score gain, as in 
Jacob and Lefgren (2008).  We then regress our estimate of future value-added on 
either the principal’s overall rating of the teacher from the summer of 2006 or the 
estimated teacher fixed effect from a student achievement model covering the 
years 1999/00-2005/06.25 
As shown in Table 12, we estimate the equation several ways, varying the 
amount of information used to estimate the past teacher value-added.  With the 
exception of the value-added measure constructed from only 2005/06 data, we 
utilize a common sample to ensure comparability of the value-added estimates.  
The sample of teachers with value-added data for 2005/06 is much smaller, 
however.  This is because we selected teachers to participate in the study in the 
                                                 
25 In addition to the estimates reported in Table 12, we also estimated the relationship between 
past value added and principal ratings and future teacher value-added using empirical Bayes 
estimates of teacher value added.  The empirical Bayes method “shrinks” teacher effect estimates 
toward the population mean, with the degree of shrinkage proportional to the standard error of the 
teacher effect estimate (see Morris (1983)).  Jacob and Lefgren (2008) argue that estimation error 
in the teacher effects will produce attenuation bias when teacher effects are used as an explanatory 
variable in a regression context.  However, we obtain results similar to those reported in Table 12 
when we use Empirical Bayes estimates in place of the non-shrunken teacher fixed effects. 
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late spring of 2006, based on whether they had student achievement data for the 
most recent year available at that time (the 2004/05 school year).  A teacher with 
achievement data for 2004/05 who subsequently left the school (or who switched 
to a non-tested grade and subject) would therefore be excluded from the 2005/06 
value-added sample.  Rather than toss out a large proportion of the sample for all 
years, we report one-year value-added estimates for 2005/06 using the reduced 
sample.  To distinguish between sample-size effects and differences due to the 
number of years of student achievement used to estimate teacher value-added, we 
also report results using single-year value-added estimates for 2004/05, which 
utilize the full sample of teachers. 
It is not obvious a priori which of the measures should be the best 
predictors of future value-added, even when past value-added includes six years 
of information.  On the one hand, we would expect value-added based on fewer 
years of prior information to be less precise, both because it is based on fewer 
student test scores and because it is subject to non-persistent changes in the 
student and teacher performance (e.g. a particularly disruptive student during the 
school year, student illnesses on exam day or temporary teacher health and family 
issues).  On the other hand, actual (persistent) teacher performance could change 
over time, in which case teacher value-added from six years ago may not be very 
informative about the future, e.g., if a teacher received tenure four years ago and 
reduced effort thereafter then the two years of value-added information prior to 
the tenure decision will be misleading. 
Our results support the first hypothesis, that random error is the key factor 
driving year-to-year variation in performance measures.  Using all available 
information, past value-added outperforms principal ratings, explaining over five 
times as much of the variation in future value-added among math teachers and 
nearly 30 times as much of the variation in future value-added among reading 
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teachers.26  The edge in explanatory power (as measured by R-squared) holds up 
when only three, two or even a single year of data is used to compute past value 
added though the differential generally falls as value added is computed from 
fewer years of data.  Thus if only a single measure is employed, past value added 
is superior to principal evaluations in predicting future teacher value added. 
When prior value-added and principal ratings are combined to predict 
future teacher performance, the contribution of principal ratings to the predictive 
power of the model also depends on the precision of the past value-added 
measure. When past value-added is based on all six years of achievement gain 
data before Summer 2006, principal ratings add virtually nothing to the predictive 
power of past value-added in math or reading.  The same is true when three or 
two years of student achievement data are used to compute prior value added.    
The results are mixed when past-added is based on a single year of data.  If data 
from 2004/05 (and the constant sample of teachers) are used, combining prior 
value-added with principal evaluations increases the proportion of variation in 
future value added that is explained from 6.6 percent to 9.1 percent in math and 
from 2.0 percent to 2.3 percent in reading, though it is not possible to reject the 
null that principal ratings are uncorrelated with future value added (conditional on 
past value added).  When data from 2005/06 alone (and the associated smaller 
sample) are used to construct prior value-added, principal ratings (which are 
typically based on multiple years of observation) do have a statistically significant 
correlation with future value added, conditional on past value added, in math.  
However, the improvement in explanatory power (measured by R-squared) is 
modest, 18 percent to 22 percent.  Similarly, adding principal evaluations to one-
                                                 
26 Similar results are obtained when we exclude achievement data from the 05/06 school year from 
the value-added calculation and use only four years of test-score data (as in Jacob and Lefren 
(2008)). 
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year past value-added boosts the ability to predict future value added slightly, 
from 11 percent to 12 percent.    
 
V. Summary and Conclusions 
 
Consistent with prior research, we find that estimates of teachers’ 
contributions to student achievement or “value-added” are at best weakly 
correlated with readily observable teacher characteristics like attainment of 
advanced degrees, indicating that other factors may be relatively more important 
in determining teacher productivity.  Prior economic research suggests that non-
cognitive factors may be particularly important, and often overlooked, 
determinants of productivity in occupations like teaching. We find that teacher 
value-added is correlated with traditional human capital measures like teacher 
intelligence, subject knowledge and teaching skills in math, while personality 
traits like motivation and enthusiasm are associated with high productivity among 
reading teachers.  It may be that the non-cognitive teacher skills and traits that we 
find to be associated with teacher productivity in generating student achievement 
also contribute to non-academic outcomes as well.  For example, Chetty et al. 
(2011) find that kindergarten class quality (including teacher quality) has 
significant effects on later non-cognitive outcomes, which in turn are associated 
with higher earnings, even though the impact of kindergarten class quality on 
student test scores fades out by middle school.  Similarly, Chetty, Friedman, and 
Rockoff (2011) find that the influence of high-value-added elementary teachers is 
strongly correlated with both earnings in adulthood and non-pecuniary choices 
later in life, like the probability of teenage child-bearing.   
The fact that non-cognitive factors are sometimes related to teacher value-
added suggests that direct observation of potential teachers during the hiring 
process and subsequent observation of teacher behavior in the classroom would 
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better identify effective teachers than the traditional system of assessing teachers 
on the basis of credentials alone.  Thus there are potential gains from giving 
school principals a greater role in evaluating teachers.  In addition to their ability 
to capture non-cognitive skills, evaluations by principals have a potential cost 
advantage over other alternatives, like classroom observation by external 
evaluators (as in the MET project).  Principals collect most of their information in 
the natural course of the job (e.g., informal conversations with parents, students, 
and other teachers), which makes the marginal cost low. 
The relative importance of intelligence, subject knowledge and teaching 
skills in determining math teacher productivity has important implications for 
recruiting and preparing future teachers as well.  Because of the apparent role of 
intelligence, this would seem to suggest that policies designed to reduce entry 
barriers and encourage the “brightest” into the teaching profession could boost 
student achievement.  However, this is tempered by the fact that subject matter 
knowledge and teaching skills seem to matter as well.  Sheer intelligence may not 
be enough; “good” teachers likely need to have adequate training in subject matter 
content and essential teaching techniques. 
While principal evaluations of teachers incorporate traits associated with 
value-added, like teacher knowledge, skill and intelligence, they also include 
assessments of a teacher’s interpersonal relationships with parents, other teachers 
and the principal, as well as a caring attitude toward students.  This divergence in 
the factors associated with teacher value-added and those which are related to 
principal evaluation suggest that principal evaluations of teachers may also be 
useful if educational objectives beyond student achievement are valued.  
The ability of principals to distinguish differences in teacher productivity 
does appear to vary across principals and across the spectrum of teacher quality.  
Contrary to the prior work of Jacob and Lefgren, we find that principals are much 
better at identifying the least productive teachers than they are at determining 
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those who are best at raising student test scores.  Thus principal evaluations would 
appear to be more valuable in retention decisions than in allotting rewards under a 
performance-pay system.  While principals vary in their ability to identify 
differences in teacher productivity, we could not identify consistent relationships 
between principals evaluation ability and either their experience as an 
administrator or their tenure in a school.  Future research in this area, with larger 
samples, could explore the ways in which principal characteristics as well as 
organizational forms and hierarchies influence principals’ ability to identify 
effective teachers.        
Our analysis of the predictive power of principal ratings and past value-
added also informs the current policy debate over the use of test scores and 
subjective evaluations to evaluate current teachers.  When value-added measures 
are constructed from multiple years of test score data, past value-added does a 
much better job at predicting future value-added than do principal evaluations.  
However, if one only uses a single year of information to estimate prior teacher 
value-added, principal evaluations add some information, though the gains are 
modest.  Thus subjective measures are likely to be of greatest value when making 
retention and tenure decisions, especially for early-career teachers, for whom 
there may be only a year or two of student test-score information.   
While our analysis is informative regarding the various ways that teachers 
could be assessed, it is important to be cautious in drawing broad policy 
conclusions from these results.  For example, while we have shown that prior 
value-added is the best predictor of future value-added, future value-added is not 
necessarily an accurate indicator of overall future teacher productivity.27  Value-
added is a noisy measure of a teacher’s impact on current student achievement 
                                                 
27 The same critique applies to the MET project, which investigates the relationship between value 
added and classroom observational assessments from trained raters. 
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and may not capture other valuable contributions a teacher makes to a student’s 
long-run success.28   Also, the fact that principals’ assessments are positively 
related to future value-added, and sometimes add information beyond prior value 
added, does not mean that evaluating teachers based on principals’ assessments 
would necessarily be a wise policy for high-stakes personnel decisions.  The 
assessments that principals offered in our study involved no financial or 
employment implications for teachers and principals’ stated judgments could well 
differ in a high-stakes context.  Also, even if principals would give the same 
assessments in high-stakes settings, doing so could influence the working 
relationships between principals and teachers in unproductive ways.   
While caution is warranted, the practical reality is that many school 
systems around the country are already making radical changes to the way in 
which teachers are evaluated and compensated.  Our results suggest principal 
evaluations can be a useful component of these new teacher assessment systems.  
First, employing principal evaluations is likely to be superior to the traditional 
credential and seniority based system of compensating teachers.  Second, in 
systems where “value-added” metrics are used, including principal evaluations 
will be most informative for early-career teachers (where value-added information 
is less reliable).  Third, because principals appear to be better at identifying the 
least productive teachers rather than the top performers, principal evaluations are 
more likely to be a reliable factor in termination decisions rather than in 
performance-pay systems.  Finally, because principal evaluations take into 
account a broader set of teacher traits than those which directly affect student test 
scores, evaluations of teachers by principals are likely to be a useful component of 
teacher assessment when outcomes beyond student achievement are valued.  
                                                 
28 For evidence on the relationship between value-added and long-run student outcomes, see 
Chetty, Friedman and Rockoff (2011). 
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Table 1 
Sample Student and Teacher Characteristics 
___________________________________________________________________________    
  Math Reading 
  Sample Sample 
  _________________ _________________  
  No. of Obs. Mean No. of Obs. Mean 
___________________________________________________________________________    
Students        
 Black 31645 0.367 30794 0.360
 Hispanic 31645 0.025 30794 0.024 
Free/Reduced Price Lunch 31645 0.335 30794 0.329 
 Achievement Gain 31645 20.729 30794 18.581 
 
Teachers     
 Male 1023 0.115 1024 0.079 
 White 1023 0.695 1024   0.724  
 Hold Advanced Degree 1004 0.332  1008 0.350  
 Fully Certified 1015 0.950 1019  0.955 
 Taught Primarily Elementary School 1023 0.727 1024  0.729 
 Taught Primarily Middle School 1023 0.149 1024  0.141 
 Taught Primarily High School 1023 0.124 1024  0.130 
 Principal’s Overall Rating 237 7.084  231  7.134  
 Rating of Ability to Raise Test Scores 210 7.200 201  7.184 
 Rating on “Caring” 237 7.384 231  7.463 
 Rating on “Enthusiastic” 237 7.249 231  7.372 
 Rating on “Motivated” 237 7.414 231   7.481  
 Rating on “Strong Teaching Skills” 237 7.544 231  7.636 
 Rating on “Knows Subject” 237 7.848 231  7.918 
 Rating on “Communication Skills” 237 7.612 231   7.758  
 Rating on “Intelligence” 237 7.911 231  7.970  
 Rating on “Positive Relationship with Parents” 236 7.483 230  7.600 
 Rating on “Positive Relationship with Students” 236 7.636 230   7.739 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Note:  Includes only students and teachers for which a fixed effect could be computed for the teacher. 
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Table 2 
Factor Loadings of Normalized Principal Ratings 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
  
Teacher Characteristic Interpersonal Motivation/ Works Well  Knowledge/ 
Rated by Principal Skills Enthusiasm With Others  Teaching Skills/ 
    Intelligence 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 Math 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Intelligent   -0.0481 0.0839 0.0606 0.7067   
Works Well With Grade Team/Dept. -0.0046 -0.0887 0.9711 0.0399   
Works Well With Me (Principal) 0.1743 0.0835 0.7415 -0.0814   
Positive Relationship With Parents 0.7231 0.0781 0.0768 0.0742   
Positive Relationship With Students 0.9408 0.0103 -0.0131 0.0636   
Caring 0.5591 0.1372 0.2422 -0.0185   
Enthusiastic 0.1086 0.9721 -0.0707 -0.0035   
Motivated 0.0398 0.5224 0.2802 0.1624   
Strong Teaching Skills 0.1512 0.0258 -0.0462 0.8471   
Knows Subject -0.0088 -0.0551 -0.0036 0.9831   
Communication Skills 0.1040 0.1705 0.2734 0.3191   
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 Reading 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Intelligent -0.0138 0.0094 0.0445 0.7064          
Works Well With Grade Team/Dept. 0.0179 -0.0581 0.8646 0.0704          
Works Well With Me (Principal) 0.1507 0.0409 0.8251 -0.0558           
Positive Relationship With Parents 0.7559 0.0511 0.0637 0.0741           
Positive Relationship With Students 0.9195 0.0258 0.0181 0.0287           
Caring 0.5970 0.0989 0.2610 -0.0385           
Enthusiastic 0.0728 0.9942 -0.0476 -0.0225          
Motivated 0.0728 0.5289 0.1894 0.2529           
Strong Teaching Skills 0.2269 0.0127 -0.0854 0.8175          
Knows Subject -0.0814 -0.0201 0.0333 0.9840          
Communication Skills 0.1484 0.2225 0.1855 0.3214           
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Note:  Principal ratings are normalized within principal to have mean zero and variance of one.  Factor analysis uses 
maximum likelihood method.  Factor loadings based on promax rotation.
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Table 3 
Pairwise Correlation of Estimated Teacher Fixed With Teacher Characteristic Factors 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
   Moti- Works Knowledge/ 
 Estimated Inter- vation/ Well Teaching 
 Teacher personal Enthus- With Skills/ 
 FE Skills iasm Others Intelligence 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 Math 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Estimated Teacher FE 1.000  
 
Interpersonal Skills  0.174** 1.000 
  [0.194] 
Motivation/Enthusiasm 0.202** 0.734** 1.000 
  [0.225] 
Works Well With Others 0.189** 0.756** 0.732** 1.000 
  [0.211] 
Knowledge/Teaching Skills/ 0.309** 0.612** 0.682** 0.644** 1.000 
  Intelligence [0.344] 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 Reading 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Estimated Teacher FE 1.000 
 
Interpersonal Skills  0.166** 1.000 
  [0.223] 
Motivation/Enthusiasm 0.336** 0.631** 1.000 
  [0.450] 
Works Well With Others 0.222** 0.716** 0.683** 1.000 
  [0.298] 
Knowledge/Teaching Skills 0.153** 0.762** 0.650** 0.676** 1.000 
  Intelligence [0.205] 
 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Note:  **indicates significance at the .05 level.  Correlations adjusted for estimation error in estimated teacher fixed 
effects are in brackets.
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Table 4 
FGLS Estimates of the Relationship Between 
Teacher Fixed Effects and Teacher Characteristic Factors 
(Grades 2 – 10, 1999/2000 – 2005/06) 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 Math Reading 
 _____________________________ ____________________________ 
 
 [1] [2] [1] [2]
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Interpersonal Skill -0.004       -0.010    
  (0.023)  (0.015)    
 
Knowledge/Teaching Skills/ 0.058***        -0.009     
 Intelligence (0.019)  (0.014)     
 
Motivation/Enthusiasm 0.008        0.042***     
  (0.022)  (0.013)     
 
Works Well With Others -0.001        0.014  
  (0.023)  (0.014)  
 
Interpersonal Skill  -0.009     -0.006  
  Elementary  (0.025)  (0.017)  
 
Interpersonal Skill  0.018        -0.023  
  Middle/High  (0.058)  (0.037)  
 
Knowledge/Teaching Skills/  0.057***        -0.013   
 Intelligence  Elementary  (0.022)  (0.016)  
 
Knowledge/Teaching Skills/  0.054        0.007   
 Intelligence  Middle/High  (0.044)  (0.035)   
 
Motivation/Enthusiasm  0.007        0.043***  
  Elementary  (0.025)  (0.014)  
 
Motivation/Enthusiasm  0.027        0.044   
  Middle/High  (0.063)  (0.037)   
 
Works Well With Others  0.008        0.017 
  Elementary  (0.026)  (0.016)  
 
Works Well With Others  -0.046        0.003 
  Middle/High  (0.059)  (0.026) 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
R-squared 0.137 0.140  0.145 0.148  
 
No. of Observations 207 207 203 203  
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Note:   Standard errors appear in parentheses.  * indicates statistical significance at .10 level, **indicates 
significance at the .05 level and *** indicates significance at the .01 level in a two-tailed test.  All models include 
controls for teacher experience, attainment of an advanced degree and a constant term. 
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Table 5 
Pairwise Correlation of Principal Ratings of Teachers With Teacher Characteristic Factors 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
  Ability  Moti- Works Knowledge/ 
  to Raise Inter- vation/ Well Teaching 
 Overall Test personal Enthus- With Skills/ 
 Rating Scores Skills iasm Others Intelligence 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 Math 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Overall Rating  1.000 
     
Ability to Raise Test Scores 0.733** 1.000 
    
Interpersonal Skills  0.703** 0.550** 1.000 
   
Motivation/Enthusiasm 0.738** 0.596** 0.734** 1.000 
   
Works Well With Others 0.762** 0.598** 0.756** 0.732** 1.000 
   
Knowledge/Teaching Skills/ 0.881** 0.752** 0.612** 0.682** 0.644** 1.000 
  Intelligence  
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 Reading 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Overall Rating  1.000 
   
Ability to Raise Test Scores 0.741** 1.000 
   
Interpersonal Skills  0.709** 0.626** 1.000 
   
Motivation/Enthusiasm 0.856** 0.702** 0.631** 1.000 
   
Works Well With Others 0.697** 0.569** 0.716** 0.684** 1.000 
   
Knowledge/Teaching Skills 0.723** 0.589** 0.763** 0.650** 0.676** 1.000 
  Intelligence  
 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Note:  **indicates significance at the .05 level.  Correlations adjusted for estimation error in estimated teacher fixed 
effects are in brackets.
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Table 6 
Ordinary Least Squares Estimates of the Relationship Between 
Principal Overall Ratings of Teachers and Teacher Characteristic Factors 
(Grades 2 – 10, 1999/2000 – 2005/06) 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 Math Reading 
 _____________________________ ____________________________ 
 
 [1] [2] [1] [2]
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Interpersonal Skill 0.096**        0.187***    
  (0.047)  (0.056)    
 
Knowledge/Teaching Skills/ 0.608***  0.156***     
 Intelligence (0.040)  (0.054)     
 
Motivation/Enthusiasm 0.054      0.601***     
  (0.046)  (0.048)     
 
Works Well With Others 0.233***        0.024  
  (0.047)  (0.052)  
 
Interpersonal Skill  0.108**  0.130**  
  Elementary  (0.052)  (0.062) 
 
Interpersonal Skill  0.051     0.505***  
  Middle/High  (0.124)  (0.137) 
 
Knowledge/Teaching Skills/  0.615***      0.190***   
 Intelligence Elementary  (0.045)  (0.058)  
 
Knowledge/Teaching Skills/  0.599***        -0.031   
 Intelligence  Middle/High  (0.096)  (0.140)   
 
Motivation/Enthusiasm  0.043        0.613***   
  Elementary  (0.050)  (0.050)  
 
Motivation/Enthusiasm  0.176        0.440***   
  Middle/High  (0.135)  (0.145)   
 
Works Well With Others  0.248***        0.056 
  Elementary  (0.052)  (0.058)  
 
Works Well With Others  0.112        -0.048 
  Middle/High  (0.126)  (0.108) 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
R-squared 0.852 0.854 0.805 0.814  
 
No. of Observations 207 207 203 203  
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Note:  Standard errors appear in parentheses.  * indicates statistical significance at .10 level, **indicates significance 
at the .05 level and *** indicates significance at the .01 level in a two-tailed test.  All models include controls for 
teacher experience, attainment of an advanced degree and a constant term. 
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Table 7 
Pairwise Correlation of Estimated Teacher Fixed Effects, 
Principal’s Rating of Teachers and Average Student Developmental Scale Score Gains 
(Teachers with Students who took FCAT-SSS exam in 2003/04 and 2004/05 or 2004/05 and 2005/06)  
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 Estimated  Ability Average Average 
 Teacher Overall to Raise Dev. Scale Dev. Scale 
 FE Rating Test Scores Score Gain Score Gain 
    (2004/05) (2005/06)
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 Math 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Estimated Teacher FE 1.000  
 
 
Overall Rating  0.204** 1.000 
  [0.232]   
 
Ability to Raise Test Scores 0.273** 0.674** 1.000 
  [0.310] 
 
Average DSS Gain 0.189**  0.189** 0.108 1.000 
 (2004/05) [0.214]  
 
Average DSS Gain 0.268**  0.055 0.121 0.370** 1.000 
 (2005/06) [0.304]  
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 Reading 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Estimated Teacher FE 1.000  
 
 
Overall Rating  0.190** 1.000 
  [0.244]   
 
Ability to Raise Test Scores 0.142 0.676** 1.000 
  [0.182] 
 
Average DSS Gain -0.401 0.146 0.063 1.000 
 (2004/05) [-0.052]  
 
Average DSS Gain 0.128 0.088 0.069 0.495** 1.000 
 (2005/06) [0.164]  
 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Note:  **indicates significance at the .05 level.  Correlations adjusted for estimation error in estimated teacher fixed 
effects are in brackets. 
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Table 8 
FGLS Estimates of the Determinants of Teacher Fixed Effects 
 (Grades 2 – 10, 1999/2000 – 2005/06) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 Math Reading 
 ________________________________ _______________________________ 
 
 [1] [2] [3] [1] [2] [3] 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Overall Rating  0.059***   0.038***   
   (0.013)   (0.008)  
 
Ability to Raise Test Scores   0.066***   0.031*** 
    (0.034)   (0.009) 
 
1-2 Years of Experience 0.048 0.105 0.076 0.027 0.025 0.054 
  (0.176) (0.169) (0.181) (0.108) (0.104) (0.146) 
 
3-5 Years of Experience           0.089 0.103 0.095 0.064 0.051 0.070 
 (0.128) (0.123)  (0.131) (0.082) (0.078) (0.111) 
 
6-12 Years of Experience 0.076 0.115 0.086 0.052 0.057 0.079 
  (0.124) (0.119) (0.127) (0.080) (0.077) (0.110) 
 
13-20 Years of Experience 0.038 0.082 0.076 0.041 0.046 0.060 
  (0.124) (0.119) (0.127) (0.080) (0.077) (0.111) 
 
21-27 Years of Experience 0.134 0.158 0.136 0.085 0.072 0.106 
  (0.125) (0.120) (0.126) (0.080) (0.077) (0.111) 
 
28+ Years of Experience 0.092           0.134 0.093 0.078 0.077 0.093 
  (0.127) (0.122) (0.130) (0.081) (0.078) (0.112) 
 
Advanced Degree -0.022 -0.025 -0.013 -0.001 -0.003 -0.010 
  (0.026) (0.025) (0.027) (0.017) (0.016) (0.018) 
 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
R-squared 0.026 0.110  0.137  0.025 0.114 0.091 
 
No. of Observations 237 237 202 231 231 201 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Note:  Standard errors appear in parentheses.  * indicates statistical significance at .10 level, **indicates 
significance at the .05 level and *** indicates significance at the .01 level in a two-tailed test.  All models include a 
constant term. 
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Table 9 
FGLS Estimates of the Determinants of Teacher Fixed Effects, 
Allowing for Differential Effects by Grade Group 
 (Grades 2 – 10, 1999/2000 – 2005/06) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 Math Reading 
 ________________________________ _______________________________ 
 
 [1] [2] [3] [1] [2] [3] 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Overall Rating Elementary  0.060***   0.038***   
   (0.015)   (0.009)   
 
Overall Rating Middle/High  0.053**   0.040**   
   (0.025)   (0.016) 
 
Ability to Raise Test Scores   0.070***   0.044*** 
 Elementary   (0.016)   (0.010) 
 
Ability to Raise Test Scores   0.055**   0.000 
 Middle/High   (0.026)   (0.016) 
 
1-2 Years of Experience 0.048 0.104 0.078 0.027 0.024 0.105 
  (0.176) (0.170) (0.181) (0.108) (0.104) (0.146) 
 
3-5 Years of Experience 0.089 0.101 0.094 0.064 0.051 0.096 
  (0.128) (0.124) (0.132) (0.082) (0.079) (0.110) 
 
6-12 Years of Experience 0.076 0.115 0.085 0.052 0.056 0.114 
  (0.124) (0.120) (0.127) (0.080) (0.077) (0.110) 
 
13-20 Years of Experience 0.038 0.081 0.074 0.041 0.045 0.091 
  (0.124) (0.120) (0.127) (0.080) (0.077) (0.110) 
 
21-27 Years of Experience 0.134 0.157 0.134 0.085 0.071 0.135 
  (0.125) (0.120) (0.127) (0.080) (0.077) (0.110) 
 
28+ Years of Experience 0.092 0.133 0.094 0.078 0.076 0.130 
 (0.127) (0.123) (0.130) (0.081) (0.078) (0.112) 
  
Advanced Degree -0.023 -0.023 -0.013 -0.001 -0.004 -0.005 
  (0.026) (0.025) (0.027) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) 
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
R-squared 0.026 0.110 0.138 0.025 0.114 0.116 
 
No. of Observations 237 237 202 231 231 201 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Note:  Standard errors appear in parentheses.  * indicates statistical significance at .10 level, **indicates 
significance at the .05 level and *** indicates significance at the .01 level in a two-tailed test.  All models include a 
constant term. 
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Table 10 
FGLS Estimates of the Determinants of the 
Correlation Between Teacher Fixed Effects and Principal Evaluations 
 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 Math Reading 
 _____________________________ ___________________________  
 [1] [2] [3] [1] [2] [3] 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Correlation Between Teacher Effects and Overall Rating of Teacher 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Principal’s Tenure at School  0.021  0.039* -0.008  0.006 
  (0.020)  (0.023) (0.021)  (0.026) 
 
Principal’s Total Experience  -0.009 -0.023  -0.012 -0.014 
 in Ed. Administration  (0.014) (0.015)  (0.013) (0.016) 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
R-squared  0.042 0.019 0.124 0.008 0.043 0.046 
No. of Observations  26 26 26 22 22 22 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Correlation Between Teacher Effects and “Ability to Raise Test Scores” 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Principal’s Tenure at School  -0.029  -0.045** 0.008  0.009 
  (0.019)  (0.023) (0.020)  (0.027) 
 
Principal’s Total Experience  0.001 0.024  0.003 -0.002 
 in Ed. Administration  (0.017) (0.020)  (0.017) (0.023) 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
R-squared  0.010 0.015 0.155 0.008 0.002 0.008 
No. of Observations  24 24 24 22 22 22 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Note:  Standard errors appear in parentheses.  * indicates statistical significance at .10 level, **indicates significance 
at the .05 level and *** indicates significance at the .01 level in a two-tailed test.  All models include a constant 
term.  Data on principal placements are only available from 1995 forward, so tenure at school is truncated at 10 
years. 
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Table 11 
Rankings of Teacher Fixed Effects by Principal Ratings of Teachers 
 
Math 
 Principal’s “Overall Rating of Teacher” Percentile Ranking 
Teacher Fixed Effects 
Percentile Ranking 
Bottom 
30% 
Middle 
40% 
Top 
30% 
Bottom 30% 65 24 11 
Middle 40% 51 32 18 
Top 30% 32 52 16 
Reading 
 Principal’s “Overall Rating of Teacher” Percentile Ranking 
Teacher Fixed Effects 
 Percentile Ranking 
Bottom 
30% 
Middle 
40% 
Top 
30% 
Bottom 30% 54 29 17 
Middle 40% 41 40 19 
Top 30% 34 45 21 
 
Note:  cell entries represent row percentages.  Only schools with 5 or more rated teachers are included. 
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Table 12 
FLGS Estimates of the Determinants of Teacher Effects in 2006/07 – 2007/08 
(Only Teachers Teaching in Same School in Which They Were Previously Rated by Principal) 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 Math Reading 
 _____________________________ ___________________________  
 [1] [2] [3] [1] [2] [3] 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Prior Value-Added Based on Up to Six Years of Teacher Performance 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Prior Value-Added  0.562***  0.532*** 0.724***  0.756*** 
 (from 00/01-05/06) (0.077)  (0.079) (0.136)  (0.144) 
 
Principal’s Overall Rating  0.052*** 0.025  0.019 -0.014 
 (Summer 2006)  (0.019) (0.017)  (0.021) (0.021) 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
R-squared  0.255 0.048 0.265 0.172 0.006 0.175 
No. of Observations  158 158 158 138 138 138 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Prior Value-Added Based on Up to Three Years of Teacher Performance 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Prior Value-Added  0.527***  0.507*** 0.371***  0.377*** 
 (from 03/04-05/06) (0.067)  (0.070) (0.081)  (0.085) 
 
Principal’s Overall Rating  0.052*** 0.015  0.019 -0.005 
 (Summer 2006)  (0.019) (0.017)  (0.021) (0.021) 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
R-squared  0.286 0.048 0.290 0.132 0.006 0.133 
No. of Observations  158 158 158 138 138 138 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Prior Value-Added Based on Up to Two Years of Teacher Performance 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Prior Value-Added  0.537***  0.514*** 0.527***  0.529*** 
 (from 04/05-05/06) (0.065)  (0.067) (0.105)  (0.108) 
 
Principal’s Overall Rating  0.052*** 0.022  0.019 -0.002 
 (Summer 2006)  (0.019) (0.016)  (0.021) (0.020) 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
R-squared  0.304 0.048 0.312 0.156 0.006 0.156 
No. of Observations  158 158 158 138 138 138 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
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Prior Value-Added Based on One Year of Teacher Performance (2004/05) 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Prior Value-Added  0.147***  0.123*** 0.098*  0.092 
 (from 04/05) (0.044)  (0.045) (0.059)  (0.060) 
 
Principal’s Overall Rating  0.052*** 0.039  0.019 0.015 
 (Summer 2006)  (0.019) (0.019)  (0.021) (0.021) 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
R-squared  0.066 0.048 0.091 0.020 0.006 0.023 
No. of Observations  158 158 158 138 138 138 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Prior Value-Added Based on One Year of Teacher Performance (2005/06) 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Prior Value-Added  0.343***  0.301*** 0.282***  0.271*** 
 (from 05/06) (0.064)  (0.065) (0.076)  (0.076) 
 
Principal’s Overall Rating  0.071*** 0.048**  0.038 0.031 
 (Summer 2006)  (0.020) (0.019)  (0.023) (0.022) 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
R-squared  0.179 0.086 0.217 0.109 0.023 0.124 
No. of Observations  132 132 132 114 114 114 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Note:  Standard errors appear in parentheses.  * indicates statistical significance at .10 level, **indicates significance 
at the .05 level and *** indicates significance at the .01 level in a two-tailed test.  All models include a constant 
term. 
 
 
